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Tim Quick teaches environmental ethics at Royal Roads University, Victoria, 
British Columbia, Canada, and is a member of the national advisory committee 
for the Canadian Centre for Environmental Education.  He is also writing a book 
on the ecophilosophy of Henry David Thoreau.  This paper may be read as a 
companion to “In Praise of Naess’s Pluralism,” the Trumpeter, Vol. 22, No. 1 
(2006): 52-68. Regrettably, Jan Zwicky was left out of the acknowledgments to a 
previous paper.  
Explanation is reductive, not comprehensive; most of the 
time, when you explain something, you discover leftovers. 
An explanation is a bucket, not a well. 
– Wendell Berry, Life Is a Miracle 
ntroduction 
ow one characterizes humankind’s relation to nature is the result of, 
mong other things, the ontology one adopts.  There are many 
ntologies; this paper focuses on one that has fostered an ongoing 
ebate in the pages of the Trumpeter.  Both Stan Rowe and Michael 
immerman have commented on Ken Wilber’s concept of “holonic 
cology.”1  It is not surprising that Rowe, an eminent field ecologist, 
as particularly troubled by Wilber's insistence that all reality is 
olons.  Zimmerman attempted to rescue the concept from Rowe’s 
lleged misinterpretation.  
oth Rowe and Wilber offer reflections on the relationship between 
arts and wholes, particularly as it applies to the human-nature 
elationship.  But there is a critical difference between things that are 
onsidered parts and those that are considered the wholes.  Wilber 
laims that humans, as holons, transcend and include all of nature, and 
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that nature is therefore a part of humankind.  Rowe, on the other hand, 
claims that we are volumetrically contained within ecosystems and are 
therefore part of nature.  Rowe’s position, Zimmerman has cautioned, 
must be abandoned because it denies humanity’s uniqueness and may 
(inadvertently) promote ecofascism.   Wilber’s theory of holons, 
according to Zimmerman, allows humans to be members of the 
biospheric community while still acknowledging our superior position 
on the evolutionary scale.2    
 
The central point of divergence between Rowe and Wilber is whether 
humans are in nature or nature is in humans.  Wilber’s “complex logic 
pertaining to parts and wholes”3 leads him to conclude that all of nature 
is in the mental/spiritual dimensions of human beings.  Rowe adopts a 
more phenomenologically based ontology, one which prioritizes 
concrete experience over abstract models. Arne Naess is aligned with 
Rowe in the sense that human beings are understood as “in, of, and for 
Nature from our very beginning.”4  The gestalt ontology favoured by 
Naess provides a rich philosophical foundation for Rowe’s view.  
 
It is important to note that all of these commentators—Rowe, Wilber, 
Naess, and Zimmerman—appear to be in basic agreement on at least 
one fundamental ontological conviction: that all life is one.  Yet, 
ontology is perhaps the most contentious issue with Wilber, who forces 
the topic unnecessarily with his intolerance of views that do not 
acknowledge that the world is, ultimately, transcended and embraced by 
pure Spirit.  Naess has the wisdom to acknowledge that all ontology is 
problematic and he does not exempt gestalt ontology.5  There is no need 
for Wilber to be so insistent.  The slogan “all life is one” provides a 
good common starting point.  But it is considered an advantage that 
there is a diversity of ways to interpret this important insight. 
 
Rowe, Naess, Wilber, Zimmerman—each is grappling with some of the 
very deepest concerns regarding life, the cosmos, and reality.  They 
should be applauded for debating these issues and for making them 
relevant to environmental philosophy.   
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Wilber: All Reality Is Holons 
 
The concept of holons is non-negotiable for Wilber, as evidenced in this 
passage from Sex, Ecology, Spirituality:     
 
Reality is not composed of things or processes; it is not 
composed of atoms or quarks; it is not composed of wholes nor 
does it have any parts.  Rather, it is composed of whole/parts, or 
holons.  
 
This is true of atoms, cells, symbols, ideas.  They can be 
understood neither as things nor processes, neither as wholes 
nor parts, but only as simultaneous whole/parts, so that the 
standard ‘atomistic’ and ‘wholistic’ attempts are both way off 
the mark.  There is nothing that isn’t a holon.6 
 
Inspired by general systems theory, Arthur Koestler chose the 
anatomical arrangement of the organism as the dominant pattern of 
structural uniformity between all levels of reality.  Rowe contends, 
however, that while useful, the concept has a limited range of 
applicability; carried too far, the abstract concept loses meaning by 
reducing the uniqueness among the rich diversity of types of systems. 
 
[Koestler’s] schematic representation took the form of a 
pyramid or inverted tree, the broad base comprising many 
sub-atomic particles, merged at the next higher level into 
fewer atoms, these into fewer molecules, these into 
organelles, cells, tissues, organs, organ systems, and at the 
top of the holarchy, the organism. Each level or holon is a 
whole to the parts below, and a part of the whole above.. . .  
This simple biological “tree diagram”—a useful abstraction 
of the organism’s anatomy composed of parts within parts 
within parts—was then imprudently extrapolated to include 
psychological and social/cultural phenomena.7 
 
 
Wilber does find Koestler’s model of “transcend and include” quite 
convenient, seeing the entire universe as holons evolving toward 
increasingly complex holons ever since the so-called Big Bang.  After 
matter (the physiosphere) came into existence, depth was added when 
matter had complexified enough to sustain life here on Earth; the 
biosphere had transcended but included its predecessor.  Gradually as 
mind evolved from life yet another level of depth, the noosphere, 
transcended but included the biosphere (see Figure 1).  Humans, in this 
view, are not merely organisms bound to the level of the biosphere, but 
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also have a depth of interior consciousness that transcends both the 
physiosphere and the biosphere.  It is by this “logic” that Wilber 
concludes nature is part of humans.  Furthermore, any view which 
reduces humans to part of a greater web of life is criticized as “an 
ontological disaster.”8 
 
Figure 1: Examples of Wilber’s Holarchies 
 
 
 
 
It is a mistake, in Wilber’s logic, to place humans within the biosphere 
because that would violate the law of “transcend and include.” 
Zimmerman explains it quite well. 
 
. . . the physiosphere is a basic building block of the organism, but 
the organism is not a basic building block of the physiosphere… 
What is specifically new to the organism, namely, the fact that it is 
alive, cannot be part of the physiosphere, without the physiosphere 
taking on a dimension that does not belong to it. The physiosphere is 
more fundamental than and arose before the biosphere. Take away 
the physiosphere, and all organisms disappear, too. The organic or 
living dimension of the organism is not a part of the physiosphere, 
however, not only because the physiosphere lacks the phenomenon 
of life, but also because the biosphere is not foundational to the 
physiosphere.9 
   
 
Since Wilber assumes that evolution produces higher and higher stages 
of consciousness, the rationality possessed only by humans gives us the 
greatest depth, which therefore makes us the superior life form on 
Earth.  Humans, then, are considered to be more complex than the 
biosphere(!).  For that  reason Wilber concludes that, on Earth, humans 
have the greatest concentration of (intrinsic) value.10   
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Because Wilber is committed to abstract concepts such as physiosphere 
and basic building blocks, the image of “transcend and include” is 
applied indiscriminately.  “For the evolution of individual holons, 
greater embrace means that more of the universe is being taken into the 
holon (is actually internal to that holon).”11 The basic concept of 
include has several senses that Wilber does not always make clear.  At 
times Wilber does talk about volumetric embrace.  In a spatial sense 
atoms may be said to be in a molecule, for example, or an organism is 
said to include cells.  However, “include” for Wilber also means 
metaphysical, or Spiritual, embrace. Depth means the interior 
dimensions of matter, and since consciousness evolved after matter, it 
must, by Wilber’s logic, transcend and include matter.  Therefore, 
nature, or the biosphere, is internal to noospheric beings like humans. 
 
When particulars are ignored and structural uniformities isolated and 
generalized they become abstract.   
 
The anatomical structures of organisms may provide a useful 
analogy for thinking about other systems and their structures, but 
organisms are not homologous with all conceivable systems. 
Significant differences in content and structure exist between 
organisms and such other systems as languages, philosophies, 
cultures, customs, economies, agricultures, climates, and so forth.12 
By an act of discursive reasoning the particulars of the world in all their 
unimaginable diversity are converted to a common currency: the simple 
abstract concept “holon.” Zimmerman recognizes that the structural 
consistency of “transcend and include” which characterizes every holon 
has been one of Wilber’s most perplexing concepts.13  In his zeal to 
explain everything—“there is nothing that isn’t a holon”—Wilber 
commits what A. N. Whitehead called the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness.    
 
This fallacy consists in neglecting the degree of abstraction involved 
when an actual entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies 
certain categories of thought.  There are aspects of actualities [i.e., 
concrete objects] which are simply ignored so long as we restrict 
thought to these categories.14   
The generalized notion of holon is mistakenly presumed to be an actual 
entity in the world.  In order for the holon concept to hold equally 
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whenever it is employed, Wilber must make several assumptions about 
the world: 
i) new dimensions of reality emerge, and are ‘added to’ the total in 
larger and larger embraces 
ii) whatever emerges later in the evolutionary time line must be 
more complex 
iii) new phenomena (e.g., life) must embrace old phenomena 
iv) the more levels of reality embraced the higher the ontological 
status 
 
As Wilber admits, this is a new twist on a very old idea, what A. O. 
Lovejoy referred to as “the Great Chain of Being.”15  To avoid any 
image of hierarchy Wilber prefers “the Great Nest (or Holarchy) of 
Being.” Holarchy or hierarchy—both are equally abstract.  In Wilber’s 
scheme, life is categorically distinct, something transcending matter 
(yet still embracing it).  But why must something ‘new’ be imagined as 
another category altogether?  And even if it is categorically distinct it 
doesn’t have to be higher than and embracing the previous.  Why not 
imagine these new dimensions as side by side?  Why imagine new 
dimensions at all?  
 
Because Wilber is committed to one type of schema everything must fit 
into his “transcend and include” image.  Rowe, while sympathetic to 
Wilber’s use of holon, believes its usefulness cannot be extended 
beyond the basic sense of meaning volumetric containment.   
 
A logical ecological holarchy follows the simple principle of 
containment, viz., each level in the sequence is enveloped as a 
physical volumetric part by the next higher level. On the homology of 
Chinese boxes that fit within one another, each higher level is the 
environment of those below. This is the sequence that Koestler 
accurately showed as the pyramidal or inverted “tree diagram” with 
the organism at the summit. Let us now take it one step further. 
From the base upward, atoms are parts of molecules, which are parts 
of cells, which are parts of tissue/organs, which are parts of 
organisms, which are parts of geographic ecosystems, which are parts 
of the ecosphere. Each higher level is the environment or “field” of 
the ones below, and each lower level is a functional part of the levels 
above. Note that in this sequence human organisms appear as one 
among many species-parts of the sectoral ecosystems that Earth 
comprises. Humans are made from and sustained by the living Planet. 
Physically and mentally they are Earthlings. Truly they are 
marvellous creatures, but not the be-all and end-all of creation. 
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That Nature-as-Earth represents a higher level of integration than the 
human is a logical extension of the holarchy of containment beyond 
the organism.16 
As Zimmerman sees it, the ongoing debate reflects Rowe’s 
misunderstanding of Wilber.  I propose that it is not so much a 
misunderstanding as it is an example of the outcomes of using different 
ontologies.  It is clear that Rowe is not so anxious to account for the 
emergence of consciousness (especially rational consciousness) or to 
explain what Life is.  He is much more phenomenolgically oriented, 
having no apparent need for transcendental dimensions that are “more 
real.”  Scholars such as R. G. Collingwood, Hans Vaihinger, and Isaiah 
Berlin believe that one’s worldview (what Naess calls a total view) 
requires basic ideas which are unproven and simply taken for granted 
about how the world works.  Berlin noticed that  
we inevitably notice and describe only certain characteristics of [the 
world]—those which are, as it were, public, which attract attention to 
themselves because of some specific interest which we have in 
investigating them, because of our practical needs or theoretical 
interests . . .  What is left out of such investigations is what is too 
obvious to need mentioning.17  
What gets left out is the examination of what Collingwood called 
“absolute presuppositions.”18  Naess has shown that it is not necessary 
to articulate one complete set of presuppositions which is definitive of 
the character of reality.19  In short, it is not necessary, nor perhaps 
possible, to determine whether Rowe or Wilber is absolutely correct.   
 
Though he called the Great Chain of Being “the official philosophy of 
the larger part of civilized humankind through most of its history,”20  
Lovejoy cautioned against adopting any one metaphysical system as 
authoritative.  He believed that among the many different cosmologies, 
philosophies, and religions, (of which the Great Chain is one) 
individuals ultimately are influenced by what he called metaphysical 
pathos.  We tend to gravitate towards a particular though very general 
description of the nature of things, a  
 
characterization of the world to which one belongs, in terms which, 
like the words of a poem, awaken through their associations, and 
through a sort of empathy which they engender, a congenial mood or 
tone of feeling on the part of the [individual].”21   
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Lovejoy noticed that there were basic units of thought that were simply 
taken for granted,  
 
beliefs which are so much a matter of course that they are rather tacitly 
presupposed than formally expressed and argued for, . . . ways of 
thinking which seem so natural and inevitable that they are not 
scrutinized with the eye of logical self-consciousness, that often are 
most decisive of the character of a philosopher’s doctrine, and still 
oftener of the dominant intellectual tendencies of an age.22 
As Naess has shown, after deeper questioning of the reasons why we 
believe something, there comes a point at which we require no further 
justification: we simply feel at home.   
 
 
Naess: Reality has Gestalt Characteristics 
 
The dominant mode of thinking in Western industrial cultures is 
characterized by a dependence on analytic method and abstract models.  
Gestalt thinking was introduced in Germany at the turn of the twentieth 
century, led by such figures as Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler, and 
Kurt Koffka, as a reaction to an overemphasis on these characteristics.  
Fritjof Capra explains that gestalt perception differs from atomistic and 
mechanistic thinking by asserting that living organisms (not just 
humans) “perceive [the world] not in terms of isolated elements, but as 
integrated perceptual patterns—meaningful organized wholes, which 
exhibit qualities that are absent in their parts.”23  Gestalt thinking 
distinguishes between the concrete contents of experience and the 
abstract constructions we formulate.    
 
While admitting that gestalt ontology is, “as every other ontology, 
deeply problematic,” Naess feels that it is vitally important to offer 
alternatives to the “near monopoly of the so-called scientific world-
view”24 with its reliance on abstract models.  Gestalt perception starts 
with our immediate spontaneous experience of the world.  “It is 
unwarranted to believe that how we feel Nature to be is not how Nature 
really is.”25  The world as we immediately experience it is endlessly 
diverse.  One does not experience holons per se because holons are not 
particular phenomena.   
 
Rowe’s ontology is unmistakably closer to Naess’s, emphasizing 
personal, spontaneous, (what has been called “naïve”26) experience of 
the world.  It is based much more on concrete understanding  than 
abstract schematics.  
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Earth, the Ecosphere, and its sectoral geoecosystems—resembling 
mega-terrariums and mega-aquariums with all their organic/inorganic 
contents—have from the beginning of time been the evolutionary 
source and purveyors of Life. Metaphorical language has equated life 
only with organisms. Ecological knowledge, by revealing the 
importance of context, shows that Earth is synonymous with Life in 
its larger sense. When the miraculous quality Life is located in Earth 
and its geoecosystems, a realistic foundation is established for a new 
kind of extra-human ethics: Ecological Ethics or Ecospheric Ethics. 
Axiomatic is the belief that organisms, including humanity, are 
secondary in importance to the creative Earth and its geoecosystems.27 
Rowe cautions against drawing sharply distinguished categories, such 
as “physiosphere” and “biosphere,” which suggest that Life is some 
extra ingredient which, by virtue of being ‘added to’ matter, has more 
reality.   
 
By making “life” a short, snappy noun and thereby conferring 
thinghood on it, the way is eased toward believing that “life” is a kind 
of mobile agent that vitalizes organisms from within and whose 
departure marks their death. But “life” is not a thing, nor is it the 
possession of organisms in an otherwise dead world.28 
For Rowe, as for Wendell Berry, Life is something mysterious and 
miraculous, a source of awe and wonder.  The result of abstracting the 
physiosphere from the biosphere, as Wilber does, is that “we have 
assigned the greater part of the Earth spaces where we live to the 
category ‘dead environment.’”29  There is no need to posit extra 
dimensions, or new spheres transcending the mundane material realm.  
Gestalt ontology requires no foundation, nothing higher in ontological 
priority, no fundamental building blocks. The sharp difference 
conventionally drawn between ‘living’ and ‘non-living’ is blurred in 
gestalt ontology.  Berry, critical of the overbearing desire of science to 
explain everything, writes: 
 
I don't think creatures can be explained. I don't think lives can be 
explained. What we know about creatures and lives must be pictured 
or told or sung or danced. And I don’t think pictures or stories or 
songs or dances can be explained. The arts are indispensable [to 
Western culture] precisely because they are so nearly antithetical to 
explanation.30 
Naess echoes these sentiments: “Rationalization of the nonrational is a 
disease.”31   
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In Wilber’s terms the physiosphere is simply inert stuff (‘dead 
environment’) until the higher animating agent of life transcends matter 
and takes it within.  One may notice a slight Cartesian hangover in 
Wilber’s view where the physiosphere is considered simply res extensa 
which is categorically distinct from the noosphere, res cogitans.  
Gestalt ontology understands the world to already be whole and 
complete, a position with which Wilber would presumably agree.  But 
the diversity of gestalts reflect different aspects of reality, not an 
ontological hierarchy (or holarchy).  In gestalt ontology, statements like 
the following simply don’t make sense. 
  
What is specifically new to the organism, namely, the fact that it is 
alive, cannot be part of the physiosphere, without the physiosphere 
taking on a dimension that does not belong to it.. . . The physiosphere 
is more fundamental than and arose before the biosphere.  Take away 
the physiosphere, and all organisms disappear, too.  The organic or 
living dimension of the organism is not part of the physiosphere . . .32  
Wilber’s holonic ecology arranges the furniture of the world to fit a 
preconceived schematic.  There is nothing wrong with this in itself—we 
all orient ourselves in the world by “unconscious mental habits.”33  
However, it is rather presumptuous to assume that one kind of organism 
(i.e., humans) among the countless millions can understand the true 
nature of reality, and that that understanding can be easily systematized, 
articulated, and communicated.  Rowe and Naess seem to share a 
concern over metaphysical entities that are claimed to be beyond or 
behind nature, pure Spirit, which somehow is more real than matter.  
These so-called higher realities are considered by Naess to be entia 
rationis, “abstract constructions created (by reason) to facilitate rational 
analysis.”34   
 
In gestalt ontology, Life evolves and diversifies within the ecosphere.  It 
doesn’t follow that increasingly complex organisms must transcend the 
presumed limitations of time and space.  (Complexity, incidentally, is 
an ambiguous term and, hence, has been the subject of contentious 
debate.)  Philosophical systems which convey a higher ontological 
status on life (bios-), or mind (noos-), or even pure Spirit hypostatize 
abstractions.35 
 
Ontology and epistemology are intimately interrelated.  Wilber tends to 
treat mundane, everyday experiences as lacking when compared to 
mystical experiences of oneness with pure Spirit. 
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All excellence is elitist. And that includes spiritual excellence as well. 
But spiritual excellence is an elitism to which all are invited. We go 
first to the great masters--to Padmasambhava, to St. Teresa of Avila, 
to Gautama Buddha, to Lady Tsogyal, to Emerson, Eckhart, 
Maimonides, Shankara, Sri Ramana Maharshi, Bodhidharma, Garab 
Dorje. But their message is always the same: let this consciousness be 
in you which is in me. You start elitist, always; you end up egalitarian, 
always.36 
For Wilber, the only ones who really truly understand reality are a 
relatively gifted few who have reached the heights of spiritual 
excellence by experiencing the entire Great Chain of Being.  For Naess, 
the world already displays a kind of perfection (again, something with 
which Wilber would presumably agree).  Yet, because the world is 
already whole and complete—in the sense that nothing is lacking—
one’s experience of the world also has a kind of perfection, and is 
therefore adequate.  “What we experience” in moments of prereflective 
awareness “is more or less comprehensive and complex,”37 and always 
unified, otherwise the world could not make sense.  Experience has 
gestalt characteristics because the world, as it is experienced, is a world 
of infinite specificity.  We never experience holons per se because a 
holon is an abstract concept completely purged of all particulars.38  
There are no absolutely “better” experiences in the sense that, for 
example a mystical sense of unity (whatever that might mean) is a 
higher experience than diversity and separateness.  Compare Wilber’s 
elitism with Naess’s egalitarianism. 
 
It feels absurd for me to think: ‘You are mere mice, I have higher 
inherent value because: 
a) I am much more intelligent,  
b) I am much more complex, 
c) I am much higher on the evolutionary ladder, 
d) I am capable of profound sorts of spiritual suffering, 
e) I am self-reflecting, you don’t even know yourself, and 
f) …”39 
Because Naess uses a completely different ontology than Wilber, he is 
always egalitarian.  It should be noted that one does not have to begin 
elitist to end up egalitarian.  There is no “higher” or “deeper” world 
than the one we experience right now.  Alan Drengson has noticed that  
 
hierarchical systems are used by literate civilizations for many 
purposes. The classification systems on which they are based have 
many unstated presuppositions about value priorities. Hierarchical 
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systems reflect the social and class structures of the societies which 
propound them.40  
 
Rowe completely inverts Wilber’s relation of parts and wholes based on 
the simple fact that Rowe is using neither an abstract model nor its 
incumbent logic.  The concrete experience of the world leads Rowe to 
conclude that humans are part of Nature.  For Rowe, Earth is not  
merely a “life-support system,” . . .  no more than a passive ark 
serving to keep afloat its organic cargo, including humanity.  The sun-
warmed Ecosphere exhibits many evolved inorganic/organic 
processes that in endless cycles link its improbable air, water, rocks, 
sediments, and organisms.  By integrating these diverse components, 
Earth shows itself to be a higher level of organization than organisms, 
just as organisms are a higher level than their organs, and as organs 
surpass in organization the tissues and cells they comprise.  So far as 
is known in the solar system and beyond, Earth, the Ecosphere, is the 
only celestial body that exhibits the closely related organic/inorganic 
cyclic processes that have been named “living” and “dying.”  As such, 
Earth exceeds in creativity and importance all organisms, including 
the human species. 41 
Naess expressed a similar position when he wrote: “In the deep ecology 
movement we are biocentric or ecocentric. For us it is the ecosphere, 
the whole planet, Gaia, that is the basic unit, and every living being has 
an intrinsic value.”42  As I understand gestalt ontology as articulated by 
Naess, one always experiences the same world in its totality.  
Experience is a dynamic process characterized by varying degrees of 
sensitivity towards wholeness and distinction, but always unified (i.e., it 
has meaning, makes sense). 
 
 
Conclusions: “All Life Is One” 
 
Holons are not gestalts.  Contrary to Wilber’s insistence, the two terms 
are not synonymous.   
 
Arne Naess clearly points out that ‘wholism’ and ‘atomism’ are 
actually two sides of the same problem, and that the cure for both is 
hierarchy.  All reality, he points out, consists of what he calls 
‘subordinate wholes’ or ‘subordinate gestalts’—that is, holons… 
Further, Naess points out, this hierachy conception is necessary to 
counteract both holism (meaning an emphasis on just wholes) and 
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atomism (just parts), because gestalts are holons; they are both wholes 
and parts, arranged in a hierarchic order of higher and lower.43 
Naess does not say that reality consists of gestalts (Wilber hypostatizes 
gestalt here).  Rather, Naess claims, one’s experience of the world has 
gestalt characteristics.  There is a profound difference, and it is subtle, 
but since Wilber is determined to see hierarchy/holarchy he interprets 
Naess in a direction that fits these preconceptions.  Although we can 
talk about higher- and lower-order gestalts, it does not follow that that 
is the way the world is constituted.  One must be careful not to mistake 
abstractions, for example hierarchy, as actually existing entities 
themselves.  Wilber does provide a model of reality which is meant to 
explain how all life can be one, but Naess finds it “unlikely that any 
change in the abstract conception of the world and the ego can 
permanently change [a] person.”44   
 
There is the issue, then, of what it means to live in a unified world, a 
world which is already whole and complete.  Unfortunately, Wilber 
seems more concerned about being “right” than searching for answers. 
Wilber finds Naess’s view, based to a large extent upon gestalt 
ontology, to be  
 
lacking in almost every respect when compared with the great 
Nondual traditions.  Even Naess himself, when attempting to present 
the similarities, fails to account for even the simplest and most crucial 
issues—for example, the notion of unity-in-multiplicity, a hallmark of 
Nondual realization.  Naess fumbles in the worst of ways: “The 
widening and deepening of the individual selves somehow never 
makes them into one ‘mass’ . . . How to work this out in a fairly 
precise way I do not know.”45 
The sophistication, complexity, and profundity of Naess’s total view —
which includes elements of Pyrrhonian skepticism, epistemological and 
ontological pluralism, and empirical semantics—is completely lost on 
Wilber.  It is rather unfortunate to see a world-class thinker such as 
Naess abused this way, especially by someone who does not know his 
work.  Those who have carefully read Naess and appreciate all the 
subtle interconnections of ideas across a vast range of subjects know 
that Naess doesn’t fumble anything.  One may disagree with him, but 
his reasoning is impeccable.  (Readers who want to gain a deeper 
appreciation for Naess’s philosophical achievements should consult the 
10 Volume Selected Works of Arne Naess for a representative sample of 
his works in English.)  Naess is a more accomplished global scholar 
than Wilber, and so not dogmatically determined to explain everything 
with one model.  I encourage Wilber to follow the lead of his friend and 
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colleague Michael Zimmerman and take more care in presenting 
Naess’s ideas.  Wilber himself knows how frustrating it is to be 
constantly misrepresented.  
 
Of course Naess may be considered “lacking” when it comes to the 
Nondual tradition (whatever characteristics one chooses as definitive of 
nondual).  Naess is not interested in promoting one definitive  
philosophy.  There is certainly a tradition of nondual philosophy, which 
Lovejoy identified and Wilber promotes.  It has a great and admirable 
history.  But it simply doesn’t mean that it is correct or true in an 
absolute sense.  We do not have to make the same choice that Wilber 
does and use the ontology and epistemology of nondualism as the 
benchmark.  Although Zimmerman has claimed that nondualism is 
central to Naess’s philosophy46 it is important to note that Naess 
himself does not use the term when commenting on his own total view.  
Neither does he order epistemology in the same way Wilber does.  “The 
world we live in spontaneously cannot be degraded as being merely 
subjective, because it is the only world that has a content.”47  Nothing is 
more real. One’s concrete, spontaneous, “naïve” experience of nature, 
in its endless diversity of creativity and form, has ontological adequacy.  
Naess is much more aligned with Spinoza’s ontology: “The more we 
understand particular things (i.e., diversity), the more we understand 
God (i.e., unity).”48  There is no need for higher experiences of 
something more real.  Each person’s experiences are more or less 
adequate, and may be said to have roughly the same value.  As I 
understand gestalt ontology as articulated by Naess, one always 
experiences the same world in its totality, with varying degrees of 
sensitivity towards wholeness and distinction, but always unified.   
 
Although I’ve contrasted their respective positions, I would like to 
stress, again, that both Rowe and Wilber are in agreement on at least 
one issue: All Life Is One.  This is a very semantically rich statement, 
and there are differing interpretations of what it means.  There is no 
need to demand one precise meaning for the phrase.   Indeed, Naess 
shows that because language has such semantic elasticity no precise 
definition of such broad general statements about the whole nature of 
reality can be given.49   
 
Where, then, do we place humans in a relation to nature?  Zimmerman 
and Wilber resist seeing humans as just another organism in the web of 
life because they claim that it reduces our mental and spiritual 
dimensions to mere matter.  Wilber pinpoints spiritual transformation as 
the answer to the ecological crisis. 
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Adopting a new holistic philosophy, believing in Gaia, or even 
thinking in integral terms—however important those might be, they 
are the least important when it comes to spiritual transformation. 
Finding out who believes in all those things: There is the doorway to 
God.”50  
In this view, people must discover their identity with God in order to 
identify with nature.  Zimmerman especially is concerned that 
identification with only nature—humans as strands in the web of life—
may lead to ecofascism.   
 
Rowe’s position is summed up thus: “Earth before organisms. 
Ecosystems before people.”51  Rowe, like Wilber and Zimmerman and 
Naess, is concerned for the ecological integrity of Earth.  His slogan has 
the impact (and shortcomings) of most political slogans: general and 
imprecise.  We are immediately presented with an array of possible 
interpretations, one of which could be ecofascism.  But because it’s 
possible to interpret “Ecosystems before people” in an ecofascist 
direction doesn’t mean it will lead to ecofascism.  (It is also possible, 
incidentally, to interpret Wilber as promoting narcissism through 
identity with God, but he clearly criticizes that line of interpretation).  A 
slogan, such as Rowe’s, is a verbal articulation of part of one’s whole 
sense of reality.  It is called up from the depths of the psyche, 
functioning more as an inspirational tool than an ontological 
proclamation.  Such broad statements, by the very nature of their 
generalizing character, are open to a multiplicity of interpretations.  The 
way a person interprets Rowe’s slogan, for example, depends on their 
entire worldview.  In other words, one’s total view provides the context 
for its meaning.  Zimmerman reminds us that not every interpretation 
will be useful.   
 
A view based on compassion changes the interpretation of ‘ecosystems 
before people.’  That is, if compassion is for all living beings, such as 
that promoted by the Dalai Lama, fascism will not be a viable option.  
Out of the array of possibilities, the one(s) compatible with compassion 
will be selected, to use a word favoured by Naess, “spontaneously.”   
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Thanks to Alan Drengson, Stephan Harding, and Amelia Mimi Warren 
for their comments on draft versions of this paper, and to Arne Naess 
my friend and mentor.  Very special thanks to the Foundation for Deep 
Ecology for providing me with a set of The Selected Works of Arne 
Naess.  
Volume 22, Number 2 23
Notes 
 
                                                 
1  See Michael Zimmerman, “Humanity’ Relation to Gaia,” The Trumpeter, 20.1 
(2004), pp. 4-20 (http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/content/v20.1) and Stan Rowe, 
“Transcending this Poor Earth á lá Ken Wilber,” The Trumpeter, 17.1  
(http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/content/v17.1) 
2  Zimmerman, “Humanity’s Relation to Gaia,” p. 6. 
3  Ibid, p. 8. 
4  Arne Naess, “Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World,” 
The Trumpeter, 4.3 (1987), p. 35.  
5  Naess, Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1989, p. 35. 
6  Ken Wilber, Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, Boston: Shambhala, 1995, p. 41.  
7  Rowe, “Transcending this Poor Earth,” no page numbers are given, see § titled 
Koestler’s Holons and General Systems Theory. 
8  Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, p. 95,  
9  Zimmerman, “Humanity’s Relation to Gaia,” p. 9. 
10 Ibid, p. 10. 
11 Wilber, Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, p. 90, my emphasis. 
12 Rowe, “Transcending this Poor Earth,” § Logical Pitfalls, my italics.  
13 “Humanity’s Relation to Gaia,” p. 8. 
14 Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (1929), New York: Macmillan, 1978, pp. 
7-8. 
15 A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1942. 
16 Rowe, “Transcending This Poor Earth,” § An Earth-Based Philosophy  
17  Isaiah Berlin, The Sense of Reality, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, pp. 14-
15. 
18 Collingwood’s term. 
19 See “Reflections on Total Views”, in the Selected Works of Arne Naess (SWAN) 
vol. 10, Dordrecht, Netherlands, Springer, 2005, pp 467-482.  
20 Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, p. 26. 
21 Ibid, p. 11. 
22 Ibid, p. 7. 
23 Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life, New York, Anchor Books, 1996, p. 32, my italics. 
24 Naess, Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle, p. 35. 
25 Naess, “Self-Realization,” p. 27. 
26 Not in a pejorative sense, but rather meaning prereflective and undetermined by 
abstractions.  In his book Gestalt Psychology: An Introduction to New Concepts in 
Modern Psychology Wolfgang Köhler wrote: “There seems to be a single starting 
point for psychology, exactly as for all the other sciences: the world as we find it, 
naïvely and uncritically.  The naïveté may be lost as we proceed.  Problems may be 
found that which at first are completely hidden from our eyes.  For their solution it 
may be necessary to devise concepts which seem to have little contact with direct 
primary experience.  Nevertheless, the whole development must begin with a naïve 
picture of the world.  This origin is necessary because there is no other basis from 
which it can arise” (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1947, p. 3). 
27 “The Living Earth and Its Ethical Priority,” The Trumpeter, 19.2 (2003), p. 69. 
28 Rowe, “The Living Earth,” p. 71. 
29 Ibid., p. 73. 
30 Wendell Berry, Life is a Miracle, Washington, Counterpoint, 2001, p. 113. 
The Trumpeter 24 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
31 Arne Naess, personal communication, Oslo, Norway, Apr. 21, 2006. 
32 Zimmerman, “Humanity’s Relation to Gaia,” p. 9. 
33 Lovejoy, Great Chain, p. 7. 
34 Naess, “Gestalt Thinking and Buddhism,” SWAN vol. 8, p. 333. 
35 Naess agreed with this point, personal communication, Oslo, Norway, Apr. 21, 
2006. 
36 Wilber’s own website, http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/misc/spthtr.cfm/. 
37 Naess, Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle, p. 57. 
38 See Wilber, Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, p. 42. 
39 Naess, “An Answer to W. C. French: Ranking, Yes, but the Inherent Value is the 
Same,” Philosophical Dialogues, Brennan and Witoszek, eds., p. 148. 
40 Drengson, “How Rigid the Hierarchy?” The Trumpeter, 13.2 (1996), p.  
41 Rowe, “The Living Earth,” p. 70. 
42 Naess, “The Basics of Deep Ecology,” SWAN vol. 10, p. 18. A version of this article 
is also in The Trumpeter 21.1, pp. 61-71. For Naess the terms ‘biosphere’ and 
‘ecosphere’ function more or less synonymously.   
43 Ken Wilber, Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, p. 57. 
44 Naess, “Through Spinoza to Mahayana Buddhism or Through Mahayana Buddhism 
to Spinoza?” in SWAN vol. 9, pp. 255-276. 
45 Wilber, Eye of Spirit, 2nd ed., Boston, Shambhala, 2001, p. 276. 
46 Zimmerman, Contesting Earth’s Future, Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1994, p. 21. 
47  “Ecosophy and Gestalt Ontology,” The Trumpeter, 6.4 (1989), p. 136. 
48 Ethics, V.24, trans. Samuel Shirley. 
49 Naess has taken up this topic in longer works such as Communication and 
Argument, Oslo: Universitetforlaget, 1966 (now SWAN vol. 7).  For shorter pieces see 
“The Limited Neutrality of Typologies of Systems,” p. 7-13 “Notes on the 
Methodology of Normative Systems,” especially pp. 17-19, and “Vagueness and 
Ambiguity” pp. 56-74, all of which can be found in the special Festschrift edition of 
The Trumpeter, 22.1 (2006). 
50 Wilber, A Theory of Everything, Boston, Shambhala, 2000, p. 137. 
51 Rowe, “From Shallow to Deep Ecological Philosophy” The Trumpeter, 13.1, 2001, 
p. 136. 
Volume 22, Number 2 25
